Uncertain inflation and the input-output choices of competitive firms by Chen, K.C. & Scott, Louis O.

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
&T URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/uncertaininflati1034chen

STX
$5
14 COPY 2
*****
riHj
i
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1034
Uncertain inflation arc 'the Input-Output
Choices oi (Competitive Firms
Lews 0. Scott
***"«*** OF THE
Collect} of Comrr.eros and Busines.3 Acmin slraticri
Bureau or Scbnowie anc Business Research
Unr/ysity of iliincis, Urbans-Champa

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1034
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
April, 1984
Uncertain Inflation and the Input-Output
Choices of Competitive Firms
K. C. Chen, Assistant Professor
Department of Finance
Louis 0. Scott, Assistant Professor
Department of Finance

ABSTRACT
En recent years, inflation has become an increasingly significant
factor in corporate decisions. This paper examines the input and out-
put decisions of competitive firms in the presence of uncertain infla-
tion. We find that most firms operate with higher capital-labor ratios
when there is uncertain inflation. The effects on output in the model
are ambiguous for most cases, but we do find that uncertain inflation
has predictable effects on the input decisions of competitive firms.

Input and Output Choices Under Inflation
I. Introduction
The behavior of the firm under uncertainty and the valuation of
risky assets have been intensively studied in both the economic and
finance literatures (Sandmo [1971], Leland [1972], Hite [1978], etc.).
It is often assumed that decisions regarding output and capital
investment are made in order to maximize the value of the firm* given
the risk-return preferences of investors. As a result, the behavior
of the firm in product markets is directly linked to financial
markets
.
In recent years, inflation has become an increasingly significant
factor in corporate decisions. Uncertain inflation will affect not
only the firm's investment and financing decisions but also its real
production decisions including input and output mixes. A rich body of
research has existed in the literature. Rappaport and Taggart [1982]
incorporate inflation considerations only in the evaluation of capital
spending proposals. Chen and Boness [1975] investigate the effects of
uncertain inflation on investment and financing decisions. Conine and
Tamarkin [1984] further show the effects of changes in uncertain infla-
tion on a firm's optimal investment policy when there are decreasing
returns to scale. Hite [1977] integrates financing, investment and
output decisions of a firm under uncertainty in capital markets, but
the imoact of uncertain inflation is not incorporated in his study.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the firm's Lnput and output
decisions in the presence of uncertain inflation. In Section II, we
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derive and discuss the optimal input and output choices under uncertain
inflation. We summarize our findings in Section III.
EI. Model Structure
Using the assumptions that only a nominal risk-free rate of
interest exists in a perfectly competitive capital market and that all
investors are risk averse and maximize expected utility of real ter-
minal wealth over a single period, Chen and Boness [1975] and Chen
[L979] have derived the following equilibrium valuation model in terms
of cash flows for a firm under uncertain inflation:
V. - - j (E(Y.) - Mcov(Y.,Yn ) - cov(Y.,Y a )]} (1)
where E(Y.) = the expected end-of-period cash flows to the share-
holders of firm j;
Y the nominal risk-free rate of interest;
cov(Y
.
,Y ) = the covariance between the cash flows of firm j and the
total cash flows of all firms (including firm j);
cov(Y
.
,Y ) = the covariance between the cash flows of firm j and the
J a
total value of random inflation, Y = V R , where V is
a m a m
the total market value of all firms and R is the rate
r • -1 a
.it ion;
X = [E(Y ) - (1+Y)V ]/[var(Y ) - cov(Y ,Y ) ]
.
m m m ma
In equilibrium, the value of firm j is the present value of the cer-
tainty equivalent of the firm's random cash flows, Y.. In contrast
J
to the traditional CAPM developed by Sharpe [1964], Lintner [1965],
and Mossin [1966], this model states that the relevant measure of a
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firm's riskiness (i.e., the systematic risk) consists of two elements:
(1) the variability risk, represented by the covariance between the
cash flows of firm j and that of the market portfolio; and (2) the
inflation risk, represented by the covariance between the cash
flows of firm j and the total value of random inflation. A positive
value of Cov(Y
.
,Y ) indicates that firm j is likely to have higher cash
flows when actual inflation is greater than expected inflation. Such
a firm is defined to be an "inflation-preferred" firm. Likewise, a
firm whose cash flows are uncorrelated with inflation is "inflation-
neutral" and a firm whose cash flows are negatively correlated with
inflation is "inflation-averse." In the following analysis, we drop
the j subscript for each firm.
At the beginning of the period, the production process requires a
stock of homogeneous capital, K, and labor, L. The capital is
purchased with the proceeds of issuing shares to the capital market,
and the firm liquidates its stock of capital at the end of the period
at an uncertain price. Thus, the depreciation rate designated by Q. is
a random variable:
5f - Q(l + z), (2)
where ft is the expected depreciation rate and z is a random variable
with mean zero. Note that this depreciation rate is the nominal depre-
ciation rate for capital and it depends on the end-of-period price at
which capital is liquidated. Since the firm is assumed to be a price-
taker in all factor markets, for simplicity, we choose capital as
numeraire and set its price at unity. The wage rate per unit of
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labor, w, which will he paid at the end of the period is independent
of the quantity of Labor hired.
w = w(l + v), (3)
where w is the expected wage rate and v is a random variable with mean
zero. The technology for the firm is characterized by a decreasing
returns to scale production function, f(K,L).~ Following the standard
analysis for a competitive firm under uncertainty, we assume that the
firm is a price taker in its product market and faces a horizontal
demand curve:
P = P(l + e), (4)
where P is the expected output price and e is a random variable with
mean zero.
The firm's uncertain cashflow at the end of the period is
Y = PQ - wL - T[PQ - wL - 8K] + (1 - 8)K
= (1 - T)[PQ - wL - Sk] + K (5)
where T is the corporate income tax rate. Substitute (5) into (1), and
the value of the firm is given by
V _L_ ( (1 _ T){PQ[1 _ X(% - aea )] - wL[l - X(a vm - o^)]
- KQ[1 - X(a - a )]} + k} (6)
zm za '
where a = Cov(e, Y ); a = Cov(e, Y ); a = = Gov(v, Y );
em m ea a
' vm m
= Cov(v, Y ); a = Cov(z, Y ); a = Cov(z, Y ).
va a zm m za a
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Using (5), we get the following equation for the covariance of the
firm's cashflow with inflation:
Cov(Y, Y ) = (1 - x)[POO - wL0 - ZKO ]. (7)
a ' ea va za
The three covariances with inflation are important for analyzing the
changes in firm behavior when uncertain inflation is introduced.
Because output prices and wages are generally correlated with uncer-
tain inflation, o and o will be positive for most firms. Since the
ea va
price at which capital can be sold should be positively correlated with
uncertain inflation, o should be negative for most firms.
za
The goal of the firm is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders.
Therefore, the objective function is to maximize the difference between
market value and initial investment, and the decision variables are
output (Q), capital, and labor:
max V - K
Q,K,L
s.t. = f(K, L)
We use (6) to substitute for V and impose the constraint by substi-
tuting the production function for Q in the objective function. The
firm's optimization problem becomes
max (1 - x)[Pf(K, L) - wL - rtKj - KY
K,L
where P = P[l - k(a - a )], w = w[ 1 - \(a - a )], andem ea ' vm va '
Q 3 Q[l - A(o - )]
.
zm za
The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are
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F - Pf (K*, L*) - w =
F = Pf„(K*, L*) - fl - Y
;
= 0,
(8)
where K* and L* are the optimal levels of capital and labor, respec-
tively. The assumptions for the decreasing returns to scale production
function (footnote 2) ensure that the second-order condition is
satisfied and that there is a unique solution for K* and L*. For the
optimal level of output, we have 0* = f(K*, L*).
By applying the implicit function theorem to F and P , we can
study the comparative statics for the parameters 0,0. and o .
ea va za
We have placed the mathematical details in the appendix and we present
only the results here. For each derivative, we are holding all other
exogenous parameters constant and examining the effect of changing a
single parameter on the optimal levels of capital and labor. First, we
examine the effect of changing the covariance between the firm's output
price and uncertain inflation.
dK*
XPf
K
(
" f
LL
+ f
LK }
. y Qda : _ 2
ea P ' r. . £ .,, - r T ,,LL KK LK
.. . XPf_(-fTO + fTir )dL" L KK LK . „
Because f and tvv are negative and fTV is positive, both derivativesLL ixis. LK.
are positive. As a result both capital and labor increase as
a increases and clearlv output increases. Next, we examine the
ea
effect of changing the covariance between the firm's wage rate and
inflation.
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dK*
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f
LK
Aw
,
Q
d%a ^ fLLfKK " 4 }
dL* _
f
KK
Xw
,
Q
l<Jva F(f
LL
fKK " fLK }
As o increases, the firm decreases labor and increases capital. We
va
obtain similar results for o :
za
f
-
X°
<da 2
2a ?(£uAk - fLK>
""« ?(f
,.L
f
KK "
f
LK '
As o increases, the firm decreases capital and increases labor,
za
The more interesting questions concern the impact of uncertain
inflation on the behavior of the competitive firm. What happens to the
optimal levels of capital, labor, and output as we move from a world of
no uncertain inflation (either no inflation or inflation that is known
with certainty) to a world with uncertain inflation? Will the intro-
duction of uncertain inflation alter the optimizing behavior of com-
petitive firms, and if it does, can we predict any of the changes? We
approach these questions by studying the first-order conditions in (8);
it is here that our definitions for inflation-preferred and inflation-
averse firms become useful. When there is no uncertain inflation in
our model all of the covariances with inflation are zero. First, we
rewrite the first-order conditions by placing the covariance terms on
the right hand side:
-8-
P(l - Xo )f T - w(l - Xo ) = -X(Po f - wo )em L vm ea L va
P(l - Xo )f - 0(1 - Xo ) - ^—*— - -X(Po F - fta )em << zm 1 - T ea K za
Note Chat \ depends on the covariance between the total cashflows of
all firms and the total value of random inflation, Cov(Y , Y ). Let
m a
X be the value of X when there is no uncertain inflation:
P(l - Xo )fT - w(l - Xo ) -X(Po f T - wo )em L vm ea L va
+ (X - T)(Po f, - wo ) (9)
em L vm
P(l -To )f - 0(1 -To ) - v = -X(P0 f„ - 00 )
em .< zm 1 - T ea K za
+ (X - T)(Po f - Oo )
em K, zm
The difference in X, (X - X), depends on Cov(Y , Y ), which is the sum-
m a
mation of the corresponding covariances for individual firms:
N
Cov(Y
,
Y ) = Z Cov(Y
.
, Y ). Some firms will have cashflows that vary
m a .
, j a
J
negatively with inflation, while others will have cashflows that vary
positively with inflation. We argue that much of this covariation
washes out across firms so that Cov(Y , Y ) is very small relative toma
Var (Y ) and that we can treat the difference (X - X) as being approx-
imately zero. It is not even clear whether Cov(Y , Y ) is positive orma
negative. For many years, economists and financial analysts believed
that common stocks were a hedge against uncertain inflation, but our
experience with inflation during the 1960's and 1970's destroyed much
of this belief. Fama and Schwert (1977) have presented empirical evi-
dence which suggests that returns on a large portfolio of common stocks
are negatively correlated with unexpected inflation. If Cov(Y , Y )ma
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is negative, the difference (X - X) is negative and most of our results
below still follow. We argue that this difference, be it positive or
negative, is negligible. Given no difference in the X's we rewrite (9)
as follows:
P(l - Xa )f - w(l - \0 ) - -X(PO f T - wo ) (10)
em L vm ea L va
P(l - Xo- )f - Q(l - Xa ) - ——— = -X(Pa f - na )
em K. zm 1 - t ea K za
When there is no uncertain inflation, the right hand sides are zero for
both equations in (10), and competitive firms set labor and capital to
satisfy the resulting first-order conditions. To analyze the effects
on capital and labor, we rearrange the first-order conditions to yield
equations for f and f :
w( 1 - Xa + Xa )
vm va
L P(l - Xo + Xa )
em ea
(11)
ft(l - Xa + Xa ) +
zm za 1-t
K P(l - Xa + Xa )
em ea
When there is no uncertain inflation, the three covariances with
inflation are ::ero. As we introduce uncertain inflation, we consider
how the non-zero covariances with inflation alter f and f and we try
to infer the ultimate effects on labor, capital, -and output. What
happens to the optimal levels of capital and labor as we re-introduce
the covariances with uncertain inflation in (10)? We explore three
different cases; first we examine two special cases which produce
unambiguous results and then we examine the more interesting case
where a and a are positive and a is negative,
ea va za
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i) a > 0, a < 0, and a <
ea va za
From (7), Cov(Y, Y ) > and the firm is inflation-preferred. The
a
right hand sides for both equations in (10) are negative. In (11), we
find that the covariances with inflation lead to decreases in both
f and f . These changes are accomplished by increasing both capital
and labor, and as a result output rises. This firm is unambiguously
inflation-preferred and K*, L*, and Q* are greater when there is uncer-
tain inflation.
ii) a <0,a > 0, and a >
ea va za
From (7), Cov(Y, Y ) < and the firm is inflation-averse. The
a
right hand sides are positive for both equations in (10). As the firm
moves from a world without uncertain inflation to a world with uncer-
tain inflation, it increases both f and f , and this is accomplished
L K
by reducing both capital and labor. The firm thus has a lower level of
capital, labor, and output when there is uncertain inflation.
iii) a > 0, a > 0, and a <
ea va za
This case is the one that would apply for most (if not all) firms,
but there is some ambiguity regarding the responses of firms to uncer-
tain inflation. Here we make use of Cov(Y, Y ) to examine the responses
a
of different firms. In the equation for C„ in (11), we decrease the
numerator and increase the denominator so that the firm will always
lower marginal productivity of capital when we introduce inflation.
The effect on f_ is ambiguous because we increase both the numera-
tor and the denominator in the f equation in (11). We focus on the
Li
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quantitv (Pa f. - wa ) in the right hand side of the first equation
ea L va
in (10). If Pa f T - wa > 0, then the firm desires a lower f T when
ea L va L
there is uncertain inflation. To reduce both f and f , the firm will
K. L
increase labor, capital and hence output. For this firm, it is also
the case that
L*(Pa f - wa ) + K*(Pa f - na ) > 0.
ea L va ea K za
By using a property of the decreasing returns to scale technology
(0 = f(K, L) > f K + fT L), we have
K. L
P0*a - wL*a - I2K*a > Pa (L*f + K*r\,) - wL*a - QK*a > 0.
ea va za ea L n va za
This condition implies that the sign of Cov(Y, Y ) is positive; there-
a
fore the firm must be inflation-preferred.
Next we consider inflation-averse and inflation-neutral firms:
Cov(Y, Y ) <0. Since K*(Pa fT, - 2a ) must be positive, the con-
a ea K za
~ ~ 3dition Cov(Y, Y ) < requires L*(Pa f - wa ) to be less than zero.
a ea va
By examining the right hand side of the first equation in (10), we
find that the firm will increase f when we introduce uncertain
inflation; therefore, the inflation-averse (and inflation-neutral)
firm is one that increases f . The combination of reducing f and
L K
increasing f can be accomplished by a variety of changes in K* and
L*, and the ultimate impact on output may be positive or negative.
The firm can reduce labor only, raise capital only, or employ a
decrease in labor and an increase in capital. The capital-labor ratio
will rise, unambiguously, for this firm.
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The remaining possibility is a firm that is inflation preferred but
has a higher marginal product of labor when there is uncertain infla-
tion. This firm may have a lower level of labor or a higher level of
capital or some combination of both. A firm in this category will
clearly have a higher capital-labor ratio when there is uncertain
inflation. Do all competitive firms increase their capital-labor
r it Los as we introduce uncertain inflation in (iii)? Our analysis
suggests that this may be true for most firms, but the one exception
might be those firms which decrease both fT and f . For all firms inL iv
(iii), we can easily show that the ratio of f to f rises as we intro-
L K.
duce uncertain inflation. Does this result imply that the capital-
labor ratio must also rise? The answer is unambiguously yes if the
production function is homothetic, but without additional assumptions
we do not have a precise result.
We have also seen that the firm's input-output decisions influence
the covariance of its cashflow with inflation. In the model,
Cov(Y, Y ) has a positive influence on value. A cashflow that is
3.
positively correlated with inflation is one that represents a hedge
against uncertain inflation and there is value associated with this
Inflation hedge. Firms that are inflation-averse (or inflation-
neutral) are firms that increase their capital-labor ratios and their
marginal productivity of labor when we introduce uncertain inflation.
These changes decrease the negative covariances of the firms' cashflows
with inflation. Firms that are not already inflation hedges will try
to move in the direction of becoming inflation hedges.
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III. Conclusions
We have employed Chen and Boness' [1975] mean-variance valuation
model under uncertain inflation to study the firm's optimal input and
output decisions in the presence of uncertain inflation. We find that
inflation-averse and inflation-neutral firms operate with higher
capital-labor ratios when there is uncertain inflation. These firms
adjust labor and capital to decrease the negative covariances of their
cashflows with inflation. Some inflation-preferred firms also operate
with higher capital-labor ratios and those firms which might be
operating with lower capital-labor ratios have higher levels of capi-
tal, labor, and output under uncertain inflation. The effects on out-
put in the model are ambiguous for most cases, but we do find that
uncertain inflation will have predictable effects on the input deci-
sions of firms.
Footnotes
In addition, Friend, Landskroner and Losq [1976] and Roll [1973]
have derived general equilibrium models which incorporate the impact of
uncertain inflation on returns in a mean-variance framework. Since all
models lead to the same qualitative conclusions regarding the effects
of uncertain inflation on returns, we use Chen and Boness' model for
the sake of simplicity.
2
f„ > 0, f > 0, f(0,L) = f(K,0) =0, f < 0, f < 0, and
2
f f - f_ > 0. Using the assumptions of decreasing returns to scale
( f is a concave function) and f(0, 0) = 0, we get the following result:
f(K, L) > Kf„ + Lf . In addition, we assume that f, „ > 0.
is. L LK.
3 ~ ~
Here we reverse the previous argument. Cov(Y, Y )
_<_ implies
PQ*a - wL*a - 2K*a < 0.
ea va za —
?Q*o - wL*o - QK*a > Pa CL*f T + K*f„) - wL*0 - flK*a
ea va za — ea L n va za
= L*(Pa f - wa ) + K*(Pa f„ - Qa )
ea L va ea K za
Because (Pa c . r - Qo ) > 0, then (Pa f, - wa ) <
ea za ea L va —
0.
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APPENDIX
We set up the two first-order conditions as a system of two
equations
:
F = Pf (K*, L*) - w =
X I-j
f
2
= Pf
K
(K*, L*) - a - j- j - = o
Next, we totally differentiate both equations and put the exogenous
parameters into a vector
_9_:
f
LL
f
LK
LK KK
dL*
dK*
tae-J
3F,
39
d6
Inversion of the matrix on the left side vields
dL'
dK*
-1
P (E
LL
f
KK "
f
LK>
£
KK
"f
LK
LL
3F '
39
3F.
IT
d9
We examine the effects of changing the parameters o , a , and a
,
ea va za
one at a time. To complete the analysis, we require the following par-
tial derivatives.
3F.
3a
ea
3F
i
9a
va
3F
i
3a
= XPf,
=
-Xw
=
za
3F,
To"
t
»F,
To"
3F,
To"
XP£
K
ea
va
=
=
-GA
za
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